Motori
04-23-2009, 05:54 AM
I have an Iranian friend who is not religious at all but he support the regime very dearly. He was in Iran during the last presidential selection this is a story that he told me upon return to US:
I was sitting in a restaurant having some chelo kabab when I saw 6 full size buses parked in front of the joint and some hezbollahis started to guide and disembark rural looking people from the vehicles. Over 200 people started to walk toward the restaurant when the owner rushed toward them and shouted at rishoo guys saying "I can't serve 200 people at the same time, so please leave". I spoke to one of the passengers inquiring what is this gathering about?", "We are going to vote" he simply replied with a high pitch voice and a big grin.
So if you think the days of "a chelo kabab for a vote" is over then you are mistaking.
I don't know on what kind of a platform AN is running this time around but I can assure you this 2 headed Snake is capable of various tricks and you will never know what type of a rabbit he will pull out of the hat this time.
Here is a rather long but good article about him from AsiaTimes:
Ahmadinejad really is the man in charge
By Shahir Shahidsaless
It is increasingly becoming an accepted fact among political analysts and politicians in the West that Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad should not be taken seriously, and that the real power in Iran rests in the hands of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
In an interview with NPR radio, former US national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski stated: "President Ahmadinejad sounds very impressive, but he's not really the president of Iran ... He neither commands the Iranian armed forces nor is in charge of the Iranian foreign policy even. The country is ruled by higher echelons culminating in the supreme leader."
According to the report entitled "Restoring the Balance", researched and written jointly by two influential institutions - the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and the Brookings Institution - which is apparently designed to provide a detailed roadmap for US President Barack Obama's top policymakers, “No movement on the core issues of interest to the United States will be possible without the approval of Iran's supreme leader.”
Under Iran's constitution, the role of the supreme leader is clearly defined over and above all three governmental branches. However, the law does not necessarily mean much in Iran and as the evidence below suggests, Ahmadinejad holds the real power in Iran, not Khamenei.
Ahmadinejad crushes rivals
During the June 2005 presidential election in Iran, a man relatively unknown to the public, let alone the international community, Ahmadinejad, the son of a blacksmith, rose to power.
Eight days before the 2005 elections in Iran, Baztab, the subsequently-banned website that was related to ex-Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commander Mohsen Rezaii, published a news item that was lost among the excitement and clamor of those days. It read: "A number of commanders of a military force are involved in vast activities in favor of one of the candidates."
The Baztab report added: "These commanders have gathered high-ranking officers of the Basij [a volunteer-based paramilitary force] and explicitly ordered them to convey the message to their personnel that Basij should support that specific candidate."
A consideration of what transpired later made it clear that candidate was none other than Ahmadinejad.
During the election, another unofficial news item revealed shocking details of a very complicated operation called "Basir", designed and conducted by the IRGC to mobilize Basiji families and their relatives to vote for Ahmadinejad. The plan was implicitly admitted by then deputy commander of the IRGC, Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr.
Prior to the 2005 election, Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani - two-time president, ex-chairman of Iran's parliament and one of the most powerful ayatollahs in Iran - was so influential, alongside Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini and Mehdi Karrubi, that it was unimaginable to think that anyone other than Khamenei could challenge their power.
One day after the first round of the election, Karrubi said: "Up until 7 o'clock this morning, I was on top. Suddenly, in an unusual jump, one of the gentlemen gained one million votes. These problems are caused by a very obscure network that even runs the show in the Guardian Council." This "obscure network", as announced later by Karrubi in his open letter to Khamenei, included the IRGC, Basij and the security forces.
In a press conference, furious over the events, he yelled: "To those who worked with love [in this election], not those who worked with profits from illegal jetties, smuggling, and the [illegal] sale of sugar and tea, I say that we will resist."
Karrubi was the first official to reveal the existence of the illegal jetties which are heavily controlled by the IRGC. Karrubi's advisor claimed that 60% of total imports went through what he called "invisible jetties". In another instance, an influential reformist and ex-parliament representative, Mohsen Armin, in his resignation letter from parliament (Majlis) warned that about US$12 billion worth of goods was smuggled annually through illegal jetties.
Following his shocking defeat in the election, in an open letter to the Iranian people, Rafsanjani - the other defeated clergy - also stated, "In an unprecedented action, by using billions [of Tomans the Iranian currency] from Baitulmal [term referring to the assets of the Islamic government] ... and government resources in an organized way, some individuals interfered illegally with the elections." He never did mention any names.
Ahmadinejad's control of oil and its proceeds
While Khamenei also establishes his power by relying on the most powerful network in the country, referred to as an "obscure network" by Karrubi, it is Ahmadinejad who has firm and close relations with that network. Why? Because Ahmadinejad is the man who can feed the network and facilitate its activities and operations inside and outside of Iran by having a strong handle on the large sums of money from oil revenues.
A confidential report prepared by Mostafa Pour-Mohammadi, the inspector general, to the Majlis regarding the illegal withdrawals from the foreign currency reserves by Ahmadinejad's administration sparked a full-blown fight between Ahmadinejad and Pour-Mohammadi, a powerful clergy, who was previously released from his duties by Ahmadinejad as the interior minister.
The amount of money withdrawn illegally by Ahmadinejad's administration is not known. However, according to Ayatollah Hassan Rowhani - a reformist and Khamenei's current representative to the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) - it exceeds a mind-boggling $46 billion.
Ali Larijani's ouster from his internationally well-known position is another example of the extent of Ahmadinejad's power in Iran.
Larijani was the secretary of the SNSC and top negotiator of Iran's nuclear issue with the West between 2005 and 2007, and the representative of Khamenei to that council. By law, it is the president that appoints the secretary of the SNSC. However, when Larijani was also appointed as Khamenei's representative in the SNSC, it was assumed that all the policies and negotiations with the so called "Iran Six" group (five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and Germany) were being dictated and controlled by Khamenei.
During the negotiations on Iran's nuclear standoff between Larijani and Javier Solana (the top negotiator for the "Iran Six" group), it gradually became apparent that there were serious differences between Larijani and Ahmadinejad - representing the ultra-hardliners - in dealing with the nuclear issue.
The friction between the two peaked in October 2007 when Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin visited Iran and had a meeting with Khamenei. Following that meeting, Larijani said to the press that Putin "has offered a special proposal" and added that "we are reviewing it now". At the same time, Khamenei's statement - which was the first and last of its kind that "we will think about what you said and about your proposal" was a clear confirmation of the position that Larijani had taken earlier.
It didn't take too long for the world to learn that there was also another man in charge of the Iranian nuclear negotiations with the West, who was largely and naively ignored.
Ahmadinejad's response was harsh and swift. In a widely broadcast statement he said, "There was no nuclear proposal. Rather, he [Putin] had brought the message of friendship and all-out cooperation." This statement - although ignored by the world - was the president's way of warning those inside and outside the country, even the Supreme Leader, not to even think about bypassing him. Larijani resigned almost immediately. This was a clear indication of the power struggle between Ahmadinejad and the ayatollah.
Surprisingly, despite the fact that Ahmadinejad had clearly overruled Khamenei's position regarding Putin's proposal and practically fired his representative, Khamenei chose absolute silence.
Khamenei understands the extent of Ahmadinejad's power, and in order to maintain his own status, has never nor will he ever challenge Ahmadinejad.
Ahmadinejad's is quoted as having said: "He [Khamenei] thinks that I am his president, but I am Imam Zaman's president."
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/KC11Ak02.html
I was sitting in a restaurant having some chelo kabab when I saw 6 full size buses parked in front of the joint and some hezbollahis started to guide and disembark rural looking people from the vehicles. Over 200 people started to walk toward the restaurant when the owner rushed toward them and shouted at rishoo guys saying "I can't serve 200 people at the same time, so please leave". I spoke to one of the passengers inquiring what is this gathering about?", "We are going to vote" he simply replied with a high pitch voice and a big grin.
So if you think the days of "a chelo kabab for a vote" is over then you are mistaking.
I don't know on what kind of a platform AN is running this time around but I can assure you this 2 headed Snake is capable of various tricks and you will never know what type of a rabbit he will pull out of the hat this time.
Here is a rather long but good article about him from AsiaTimes:
Ahmadinejad really is the man in charge
By Shahir Shahidsaless
It is increasingly becoming an accepted fact among political analysts and politicians in the West that Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad should not be taken seriously, and that the real power in Iran rests in the hands of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
In an interview with NPR radio, former US national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski stated: "President Ahmadinejad sounds very impressive, but he's not really the president of Iran ... He neither commands the Iranian armed forces nor is in charge of the Iranian foreign policy even. The country is ruled by higher echelons culminating in the supreme leader."
According to the report entitled "Restoring the Balance", researched and written jointly by two influential institutions - the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and the Brookings Institution - which is apparently designed to provide a detailed roadmap for US President Barack Obama's top policymakers, “No movement on the core issues of interest to the United States will be possible without the approval of Iran's supreme leader.”
Under Iran's constitution, the role of the supreme leader is clearly defined over and above all three governmental branches. However, the law does not necessarily mean much in Iran and as the evidence below suggests, Ahmadinejad holds the real power in Iran, not Khamenei.
Ahmadinejad crushes rivals
During the June 2005 presidential election in Iran, a man relatively unknown to the public, let alone the international community, Ahmadinejad, the son of a blacksmith, rose to power.
Eight days before the 2005 elections in Iran, Baztab, the subsequently-banned website that was related to ex-Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commander Mohsen Rezaii, published a news item that was lost among the excitement and clamor of those days. It read: "A number of commanders of a military force are involved in vast activities in favor of one of the candidates."
The Baztab report added: "These commanders have gathered high-ranking officers of the Basij [a volunteer-based paramilitary force] and explicitly ordered them to convey the message to their personnel that Basij should support that specific candidate."
A consideration of what transpired later made it clear that candidate was none other than Ahmadinejad.
During the election, another unofficial news item revealed shocking details of a very complicated operation called "Basir", designed and conducted by the IRGC to mobilize Basiji families and their relatives to vote for Ahmadinejad. The plan was implicitly admitted by then deputy commander of the IRGC, Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr.
Prior to the 2005 election, Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani - two-time president, ex-chairman of Iran's parliament and one of the most powerful ayatollahs in Iran - was so influential, alongside Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini and Mehdi Karrubi, that it was unimaginable to think that anyone other than Khamenei could challenge their power.
One day after the first round of the election, Karrubi said: "Up until 7 o'clock this morning, I was on top. Suddenly, in an unusual jump, one of the gentlemen gained one million votes. These problems are caused by a very obscure network that even runs the show in the Guardian Council." This "obscure network", as announced later by Karrubi in his open letter to Khamenei, included the IRGC, Basij and the security forces.
In a press conference, furious over the events, he yelled: "To those who worked with love [in this election], not those who worked with profits from illegal jetties, smuggling, and the [illegal] sale of sugar and tea, I say that we will resist."
Karrubi was the first official to reveal the existence of the illegal jetties which are heavily controlled by the IRGC. Karrubi's advisor claimed that 60% of total imports went through what he called "invisible jetties". In another instance, an influential reformist and ex-parliament representative, Mohsen Armin, in his resignation letter from parliament (Majlis) warned that about US$12 billion worth of goods was smuggled annually through illegal jetties.
Following his shocking defeat in the election, in an open letter to the Iranian people, Rafsanjani - the other defeated clergy - also stated, "In an unprecedented action, by using billions [of Tomans the Iranian currency] from Baitulmal [term referring to the assets of the Islamic government] ... and government resources in an organized way, some individuals interfered illegally with the elections." He never did mention any names.
Ahmadinejad's control of oil and its proceeds
While Khamenei also establishes his power by relying on the most powerful network in the country, referred to as an "obscure network" by Karrubi, it is Ahmadinejad who has firm and close relations with that network. Why? Because Ahmadinejad is the man who can feed the network and facilitate its activities and operations inside and outside of Iran by having a strong handle on the large sums of money from oil revenues.
A confidential report prepared by Mostafa Pour-Mohammadi, the inspector general, to the Majlis regarding the illegal withdrawals from the foreign currency reserves by Ahmadinejad's administration sparked a full-blown fight between Ahmadinejad and Pour-Mohammadi, a powerful clergy, who was previously released from his duties by Ahmadinejad as the interior minister.
The amount of money withdrawn illegally by Ahmadinejad's administration is not known. However, according to Ayatollah Hassan Rowhani - a reformist and Khamenei's current representative to the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) - it exceeds a mind-boggling $46 billion.
Ali Larijani's ouster from his internationally well-known position is another example of the extent of Ahmadinejad's power in Iran.
Larijani was the secretary of the SNSC and top negotiator of Iran's nuclear issue with the West between 2005 and 2007, and the representative of Khamenei to that council. By law, it is the president that appoints the secretary of the SNSC. However, when Larijani was also appointed as Khamenei's representative in the SNSC, it was assumed that all the policies and negotiations with the so called "Iran Six" group (five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and Germany) were being dictated and controlled by Khamenei.
During the negotiations on Iran's nuclear standoff between Larijani and Javier Solana (the top negotiator for the "Iran Six" group), it gradually became apparent that there were serious differences between Larijani and Ahmadinejad - representing the ultra-hardliners - in dealing with the nuclear issue.
The friction between the two peaked in October 2007 when Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin visited Iran and had a meeting with Khamenei. Following that meeting, Larijani said to the press that Putin "has offered a special proposal" and added that "we are reviewing it now". At the same time, Khamenei's statement - which was the first and last of its kind that "we will think about what you said and about your proposal" was a clear confirmation of the position that Larijani had taken earlier.
It didn't take too long for the world to learn that there was also another man in charge of the Iranian nuclear negotiations with the West, who was largely and naively ignored.
Ahmadinejad's response was harsh and swift. In a widely broadcast statement he said, "There was no nuclear proposal. Rather, he [Putin] had brought the message of friendship and all-out cooperation." This statement - although ignored by the world - was the president's way of warning those inside and outside the country, even the Supreme Leader, not to even think about bypassing him. Larijani resigned almost immediately. This was a clear indication of the power struggle between Ahmadinejad and the ayatollah.
Surprisingly, despite the fact that Ahmadinejad had clearly overruled Khamenei's position regarding Putin's proposal and practically fired his representative, Khamenei chose absolute silence.
Khamenei understands the extent of Ahmadinejad's power, and in order to maintain his own status, has never nor will he ever challenge Ahmadinejad.
Ahmadinejad's is quoted as having said: "He [Khamenei] thinks that I am his president, but I am Imam Zaman's president."
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/KC11Ak02.html