The daily post didnt automaticly arrive, or I just missed it, whatever ..

<table bgcolor="#ffffff" border="0" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0" width="100%"><tbody><tr><th colspan="2" dir="ltr" align="left">Review of Iran's Relations with PGCC </th></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" dir="ltr"> By Dr. Mohammad Hossein Hafeziyan
Source: Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies (MERC) (http://fa.merc.ir/)
Translated By: Iran Review (http://www.iranreview.org/)
http://www.payvand.com/news/10/may/Iran-PGCC.jpgReview of Iran's Relations with PGCC during President Ahmadinejad's First Term
Introduction
Mr. Ahmadinejad is the first Iranian president to have taken part in a summit meeting of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council (PGCC) during the past three decades.
He is also the sole Iranian leader who has visited the United Arab Emirates. The main question is what factor has caused unprecedented developments in bilateral relations which have finally maintained those relations at a reasonable level despite predictions about more tension between Iran and PGCC under President Ahmadinejad?
The main hypothesis of this paper which aims to answer the above questions is that mutual interest in maintaining those relations and unprecedented initiatives by President Ahmadinejad are major reasons which have kept bilateral relations at a high level similar to a decade before.
http://www.payvand.com/news/08/aug/Persian-Gulf-map.jpg
Arabs' first reactions to new Iranian president
Interestingly, most Arab countries welcomed election of President Ahmadinejad despite historical background of tense relations with Iran. Ignoring longstanding differences with Tehran, the oil-rich neighbors of Iran along the southern rim of the Persian Gulf sent warm felicitation messages to the new president who asserted that he would give priority to improvement of Iran's relations with the Arab and Muslim world. Saudi leaders, especially the ailing King Fahd, were among the first heads of state to congratulate President Ahmadinejad and similar sentiments were expressed by Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates despite longstanding differences between the latter country and Iran over three strategic islands in the Persian Gulf. PGCC, whose members consist of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, expressed hope that the new Iranian president would "turn a new leaf" in Iran's relations with its southern neighbors.
At the same time, however, some Arab analysts warned that election of President Ahmadinejad will worsen tensions between Iran and some oil-rich countries of the Persian Gulf. Ahmad al-Rabi', who teaches at Kuwait's Liberal University and a former parliamentarian, noted that election of the new Iranian president will lead to regional isolation of Iran. Iran, on the other hand, announced that it would continue to pursue détente with the Arab and the Muslim world. In his first press conference after the election, President Ahmadinejad said, "Considerable progress has been made thus far and more progress will be made. We will witness expansion of relations with the Muslim world and regional states." He added that "this is a priority for our foreign policy. The Persian Gulf is the gulf of peace and justice and we seek understanding with the Persian Gulf states and friendly relations to defend its interests."
Meanwhile, in a surprising state of affairs, President Ahmadinejad received a letter of invitation to take part in the annual summit meeting of PGCC in Doha, Qatar, in 2007. In fact, he was the first Iranian president to take part in such a meeting since the Council was established 26 years ago. During the meeting, the Iranian president noted that Iran sought peace and security without influence of foreign powers and proposed conclusion of economic and security treaties among seven members of PGCC in order to serve people of the region and maintain peace and stability. Many analysts maintained that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's presence in that meeting was a highlight of the 28th summit of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council. However, the final statement of the meeting contained nothing about participation of Iran or proposals forwarded by the Iranian president. The only response to Iran's initiative was short remarks by Qatari chairman of the meeting who welcomed the Iranian president and promised that participants would go through his proposals.
http://www.payvand.com/news/08/apr/Iranian-Islands-Persian-Gulf.jpg
Dispute over three Iranian islands
During the past 15 years, territorial disputes between Iran and UAE over three Iranian islands in the Persian Gulf have overshadowed Iran's relations with all members of PGCC. Even friendly gestures by Mr. Khatami failed to resolve those differences, but simply controlled them. As usual, this issue was brought up in the first meeting of PGCC after election of the new Iranian president. Secretary-general of the Council claimed in Abu Dhabi on December 18, 2005, that despite UAE's frequent requests for peaceful negotiation over the islands or referring the case to International Court of Justice, Iran continued to occupy those islands. The then spokesman of the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hamid Reza Asefi, announced on December 19, 2005, that PGCC claims on three Iranian islands were "baseless and unacceptable" and repetitive. He added that Iran and UAE should determine the fate of Abu Mousa Island through bilateral talks. The dispute raged at a time that, according to a report released by an Iranian cultural publication, an estimated population of 400,000 Iranians controlled about 300 billion dollars of liquidity in Dubai. Other studies produced a much lower figure of about 20 billion dollars, which is still a remarkable amount of money. Iranian economic entities account for nearly one-tenth of companies in Dubai free zone which is a tax-free zone. Such exchanges have increased trade volume between UAE and Iran from 4 billion dollars in 2003 to 7 billion dollars in 2005. This figure excludes the volume of illegal trade on which no accurate statistics has ever existed.
Despite diplomatic disputes between the two sides of the Persian Gulf, both Arabs and Iranians are willing to continue interactions. Following adoption of sanctions resolutions against Iran by the United Nations Security Council, which included sanctions against the Iranian banks, the United Arab Emirates continued trade with Iran despite pressures from the United States to sever financial relations with Tehran. There are about 300 weekly flights between the two countries and about 9,500 companies in UAE have Iranian partners which own up to 49 percent of their stocks.
Anyway, disputes over three islands were not resolved during President Ahmadinejad's first term in office because neither party to that depute was ready to agree on dispute settlement arrangements. Although in May 2007, President Ahmadinejad became the first Iranian head of state to have visited the United Arab Emirates since its independence in 1971, the visit did nothing to reduce tension. In addition, although Arab countries of the Persian Gulf and Iran have different viewpoints on three islands, the dispute has not affected all aspects of bilateral relations. There are also mutual concerns over geographical, political, economic, security and cultural issues. Therefore, mutual trust is of utmost importance to both sides.
Aftershocks of Iran's nuclear program
Arab countries of the Persian Gulf have preferred to remain silent about Iran's nuclear program during most of the period that it has been a hot debate. That silence concerned the United States and American analysts maintained that any public remarks by the Persian Gulf state officials on the consequences of a possible nuclear mishap in Iran was greatly pleasing to Washington. Since Iran is located in a quake-prone region, a nuclear accident is quite probable and has been a repetitive theme of US diplomatic efforts in recent years. It seems that Arab states expected Iran to reward countries which had taken less aggressive positions on the nuclear crisis, or at least, remember their cooperation. Perhaps, this is why Qatar voted negative to Security Council resolution 1696 on Iran's nuclear program in July 2006. In fact, Qatar was the only non-permanent member of the Security Council to vote against that resolution. Arab countries of the Persian Gulf have little, if any, leverage against Iran and are not willing to pay the high price of a lost war. They know that Iran is willing to get economic advantages and security guarantees which can be only accorded by the United States and the European countries. They can do little within this context. They just thanked Iran once for its acceptance of a deal proposed by the European countries which served to reduce tension between the two sides.
However, after escalation of tension over Iran's nuclear program which amounted to adoption of three sanctions resolutions against Iran by the United Nations Security Council, Arab countries of the Persian Gulf believed that they should play a more active role in the crisis. Therefore, they met with permanent members of the Security Council on December 16, 2008, after which they came under severe fire from Iran.
The British Foreign Minister David Miliband, announced that the meeting was convened to allow 5+1 discuss concerns of Arab countries over Iran's nuclear ambitions. Following the meeting, Iran warned the Arab countries that they should not take sides with the west in the nuclear case. The speaker of the Iranian parliament, Ali Larijani, for example, called on the Arab countries not to get involved in Iran's nuclear case. He advised Arab states not to interfere in the nuclear case because it would "damage their prestige." Therefore, Iran prefers Arab countries to remain silent in the nuclear case if they are not willing to back Iran because their involvement will change the nature of the nuclear standoff from a dispute between Iran and the west to a dispute between Iran and international community.
Conclusion
A new chapter has been opened in Iran's relations with its southern neighbors which is not necessarily marked with tension and hostility as was the case during the first decade following the Islamic Revolution. The fact that President Ahmadinejad is the first Iranian president to take part in PGCC summit and visit the United Arab Emirates proves that some early analyses were based on misunderstandings and relations between Iran and the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council are too deep-rooted to be influenced by changes in government. The reason is clear: both sides need each other in order to keep the whole region safe and secure. The way Iranians will finally solve the existing nuclear crisis with western powers will have great bearing on political relations between the two sides of the Persian Gulf. However, there is no doubt that in case of military faceoff between Iran and the United States, Arab countries of the Persian Gulf will not take sides with Washington as this will save them from Iran's retaliation. Of course, they will be happy to see a weakened Iran.
Maintaining the status quo while US sanctions against Iran are in force would be a great economic and diplomatic advantage for most Arab countries of the Persian Gulf, especially the United Arab Emirates. A weakened Iran will serve their interests, but serious crisis in the region will deal serious blows to their economies. Therefore, any step aimed at reducing tension between Tehran and Washington or possible rapprochement will not be a desirable option for the Arab states.
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A Kafkaesque Realm of Cyber Censorship

by HAMID FAROKHNIA in Tehran

09 May 2010 00:121 Comment (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2010/05/a-kafkaesque-realm-of-cyber-censorship.html?utm_campaign=homepage&utm_medium=feeds&utm_source=feeds#comments)

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/images/55085_583.jpgDraconian laws yield unintended consequences for hardline websites. In 2008, the Iranian government boasted of censoring (http://%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%85-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%86%D8%AA%DB%8C.iranictnews.ir/T_85846_____%D9%81%DB%8C%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1-5-%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%84%DB%8C%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%B3%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%86%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%DA%A9%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%B1.htm) five million Internet sites deemed potentially improper or immoral. The number of restricted sites has skyrocketed since the birth of the democratic movement in 2009. With more than 24 million Internet users by official count, a figure that grew 49 percent in the past year, Iran is second after Israel in the Middle East, making cyberspace a major target of censorship for the Islamic Republic.
Cyber censorship has been so pervasive and indiscriminate that even the regime's supporters have not been immune. Recently, several well-known hardline weblogs were caught in the censor's dragnet, prompting righteous howls of indignation from contributors and readers alike. In a bizarre twist, Mehdi Sarami, the man nominally in charge of "Internet filtering," admits he is largely powerless to ensure that pro-government sites do not continue to run into censorship trouble.
On April 9, the far right website Raja News broke the news of how several hardline blogs had been mysteriously blocked by orders from the government. The site's bewildered correspondent interviewed some of the affected bloggers, who seemed equally flummoxed. Omid Hosseini, whose weblog Ahestan (http://ahestan.wordpress.com/) was a top winner in the Revolutionary Guards-sponsored extravaganza "Eight Months of Cyber War" last year, speculated that perhaps his unique style of reporting had incurred the displeasure of the censors. "I don't know on what basis the 'filtering committee' is operating every night and day of the week," he complained.
Ahestan wasn't alone in this predicament. According to Raja News, the other victims included such stalwarts of the right as Esmail News (http://esmail.mohammadi.ir/weblog/), Madreseyema (http://madreseyema.blogfa.com/), and Khateratjebhe (http://www.davodabadi.blogfa.com/). The article implied that several less prominent rightist blogs and other sites had also been blocked quietly in recent months.
Raja News tried to get to the bottom of the mystery by interviewing Mehdi Sarami, the official in charge of Internet censorship. Sarami, a 30-year-old electrical engineer from Sharif University, is a full-time representative of the Guidance Ministry on the Cyber Crimes Committee, a sort of high command for Iran's censors. In the interview, Sarami deplored the closure of the rightist blogs and shifted the blame to other agencies. "We don't close down any blogs," he said. "We only sent our findings to the public prosecutor and they are the ones who decide what to do about various sites."
Sarami also revealed that many privately owned ISPs routinely engaged in censorship of their own. "The ISPs must be pressured to remove their parallel filtering. The mechanisms which have been improperly used by them must be eliminated once and for all -- unless of course, they are used on direct orders of the judiciary."
Asked why his office often expressed ignorance of the blocking of certain sites, Sarami explained that a judge can directly order a block in response to private complaints. "That judge is normally obligated to inform our task force of his decision," he said, implying that this communication does not always happen.
The Raja News reporter asked why the opening page that pops up in lieu of a blocked site looks different at times from the official blockpage. Sarami explained that it was likely due to the "parallel filtering" practiced by some of the country's unruly ISPs. He said that the procedure evidenced by such pages was illegal and needed to be addressed by the Internet regulatory agency.
Sarami gave a second interview (http://tabnak.ir/fa/pages/?cid=95360) two days later, this time to the influential Talabeblog (http://www.talabeblog.ir/), a portal for young clerics and seminarians. He elaborated on the issues he had already addressed and offered new revelations -- while providing further insight into the workings of a censor's mind.
He first differentiated between "filtering" (or "blocking") and "shutting down." The former, we learn, is what has taken place when the official pop-up page of the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance appears on your computer screen. When the latter occurs, nothing appears in place of the site -- supposedly a stronger form of punishment. He referred Talabeblog readers to Samandehi.ir, where the full list of 50 Internet offenses are listed for users' edification.
The interviewer wondered why it was that young, politically correct Muslims should suffer the same punishment supposedly reserved for counterrevolutionaries. Sarami responded with an analogy: Sometimes, just one or two burglaries in a neighborhood over an entire year will prompt residents to call for round-the-clock policing. He went so far as to discourage extensive blogging by young hardliners. As an alternative, he pointed out, "There are useful social networks that people can refer to available on the mofidnet.ir site." It was important to use the recommended mofidnet sites, he said, because "the U.S. government had arrogated itself the right to pry into other communication systems. The U.S. State Department "disseminates software that enables it to monitor the private data and information of users," he said, adding that "Gmail has a secret agreement with the U.S. government" for this purpose.
He described the Iranian censorship situation in general as comparing favorably with that in the United States and other countries. "We are witness to a more pervasive form of filtering in the United States. Over there, every single Internet user and the way they operate is closely monitored. The moment they use an illegal site or email to that site, there is a criminal investigation opened against that person. It is a sort of eavesdropping.... It is called the Patriot Act." He continued, "Friends who are studying abroad tell me that they can not email certain kinds of information, that there is a reign of fear there."
Finally, Sarami addressed the question of whether there is an unaccountable "shadowy group" behind the filtering system and if anything could be done to rectify the situation. Describing the higher public profile of the committee on which he sits, he replied, "Perhaps until about six months ago that might have been the case, but our lines of communication have grown dramatically since then.... It may interest you to know that much of the filtering was effectively done by the people themselves, through complaints they lodged against these sites which were then directed to our task force for investigation."
Filtering Galore
It is clear that outside the authorized filtering system, there is a good deal of parallel filtering going on by commercial ISPs in Iran. But rather than a sign of rogue behavior by private firms, this activity is the inevitable consequence of draconian laws that hold ISPs accountable for their clients' content.
In December 2001, the inter-agency Committee in Charge of Determining Unauthorized Sites (CCDUS) was set up under directives of the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution. It was tasked with drawing up criteria for the official blocking of websites, previously left to the discretion of the individual censors. The new committee was made up of representatives from the ministries of Intelligence, Guidance, and Communications, as well as the judiciary. The Ministry of Communications was assigned to develop or obtain the most advanced filtering devices in the world. Ultimately, SmartFilter, a product developed by the American firm Secure Computer, was procured (http://opennet.net/studies/iran2005). In November 2006, proposed regulations governing censorship and punishment for web content violation were submitted to the Majles. The conservative-controlled parliament quickly voted (http://samandehi.ir/mainMenuNL.html) them into law.
Under the regulations, a significant legal burden was placed on Internet data carriers. Commercial ISPs were now subject to fines and dissolution should their clients be caught breaking the newly restrictive censorship laws (http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:wFuA2PzVg0QJ:www.mrt-rrt.gov.au/ArticleDocuments/89/irn34845.pdf.aspx+iran+law+censorship+internet&hl=en&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESg8GB_4VNoCInBNKw3bkiuOEYLQ1m7-fR51CVYc440QaOCDbO7F4ROvpY_VQMrXVR3f0v21-84dWyS8_GRpKNJ59EJGlzEJhKjqZ6i90dGXjmCGgEAmjeymkArpgPY3NNi0sddV&sig=AHIEtbTrIOt-HrdLVfyLB04JDhiiipmEhw). And it was clear that the government took the matter seriously. Not long before the new Cyber Crimes Bill was implemented, a group of 21 bloggers had been arrested and charged with national security offenses ranging from undermining of the state to fomenting social strife to criticizing the Supreme Leader. One of them, Yaghoob Mehrnahad, was executed for alleged ties with the Baluch armed group Jondollah. In November 2005, several IPSs in the city of Karaj were permanently closed down by the local Cyber Crimes Unit involving the public prosecutor, the Communications Ministry, West Tehran Intelligence, the Naja, and the Basij.
A year and a half ago, Enhanced Punishment of the Disrupters of Psychological Security, a bill orchestrated by the Revolutionary Guards and brought to the floor of the Majles by hardline representatives, was approved. It stipulates the death penalty for advocating "corruption, prostitution, and apostasy" on the Internet, placing such activity on a par with smuggling, kidnapping, armed robbery, and the like. This law has made Iran the world's leading violator of cyber rights. Small wonder that commercial ISPs routinely engage in ad hoc censorship.
A few days after Raja News ran the story of the hardline website blockages, it provided the basis for an expose that appeared on BBC Persian (http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/2010/04/100429_l07_iran_rajanews_filtering_cyberspace.shtml). In a perfectly ironic act of self-censorship, mirroring the tortuousness of Iran's electronic highways, Raja News responded by taking down its own article.
Hamid Farokhnia is a staff writer at Iran Labor Report and covers the capital for Tehran Bureau.
<small>Photo: Censor-in-Chief Mehdi Sarami. </small>
Copyright © 2010 Tehran Bureau

<table bgcolor="#ffffff" border="0" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0" width="100%"><tbody><tr><th colspan="2" dir="ltr" align="left">Apocalyptic Islam: Interview with Dr. Abbas Amanat </th></tr> <tr><td colspan="2" dir="ltr"> By Fariba Amini (tetea28@aol.com)
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Apocalyptic Islam and Iranian Shi'ism
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Dr. Abbas Amanat is professor of History and International and Area Studies at Yale University (http://www.yale.edu/history/faculty/amanat.html) in New Haven Connecticut. Prof. Amanat graduated from Tehran University and received his Ph.D. from Oxford University in England. He is the author of many books and articles among them Pivot of the Universe: Nasir al-Din Shah and the Iranian Monarchy, 1831-1896 (1997) and Resurrection and Renewal: the Making of the Babi Movement in Iran, 1844-1850 (1989). His current book, Apocalyptic Islam and Iranian Shi'ism, published by I.B. Taurus (2009), examines the millenarian roots and manifestations of Shi'ism as it developed in Iran. It covers many issues relevant to today's discussions on Islam, Shi'ism and the Islamic Republic. He is currently working on a biography of the poet Fatima Baraghani Qurrat al-'Ayn (Tahirah) and a documentary history of Qajar Iran (in Persian). Professor Amanat has been a mentor to many students, both Iranians and Americans. As one of his former students says about him, "my years as a Ph.D. student at Yale were formative in various ways due to the presence of Prof. Amanat in my life as my mentor and a friend. Prof. Amanat's scholarly advice, intellectual guidance, and enthusiasm inspired me throughout my work."
In your recent book you talk about Shi'ia jurisprudence during the Qajar and Safavid periods, but you mention that it was not very relevant. Why would we, after 200 years or so, then see the crafting and the implementation of the idea of Vilayat- e- faqhih?

In my book I have tried to show that in modern times, and especially in the 20th century after the Constitutional Revolution and the rise of Pahlavi secularism, the Shi'i clerical establishment failed to rise up to the challenge of modernity by modernizing its essentially arcane Shi'i legal methods and institutions, concepts and practices. Both the "principles of jurisprudence" (osul-e fiqh) which is the methodology of law, and the actual instructions (foru'), lagged behind the needs of the time. Orthodox Shi'ism remained hopelessly preoccupied with outdated ideas of devotional rites and practices, ritual cleanliness, unpracticed and impracticable penal laws and so on. Loss of major institutions such as the education and the judiciary to the Pahlavi state helped marginalize the clergy. Instead the isolate establishment, and especially the younger and more radical members, sought social relevance not in legal modernity and reconsideration of Islamic law but in political activism and opposition to the secular policies of the state and its real or presumed subservience to Western values and Western powers. This is particularly evident after the 1960's.
As I have shown, the doctrine of the "authority of the jurists" (vilayat-e faqih) was a clear example of this shift from legalism to political power; an attempt to become relevant and regain the lost privileges. Contrary to common misperceptions about the clergy's opposition to the state, throughout its history the clerical establishment in Iran almost never entertained a claim over political power; an area that traditional Shi'i jurists for centuries tried to avoid. Any form of government except that of the Mahdi was perceived as a necessary evil; an oppressor (ja'er) that the pure and godly should avoid rather than embrace. Vilayat-e faqih should thus be seen as an act of empowerment, a discovery of the political potency of an Islamic ideology, while bypassing legal modernity. Even up to our time, some thirty years after the revolution, the Islamic Republic has yet to find adequate answers to the demand for doctrinal and legal modernity; issues such as human rights, freedom of speech, gender and minorities, and a humane penal code.
The Idea of the Hidden Imam or Mahdi is an important part of the Shi'a religion. How do the clerics give legitimacy to this idea?

The Shi'i clerical establishment always had an uneasy attitude toward messianic Shi'ism and promises for the return of the Mahdi. The Shi'i clerical scholarship wrote over a millennium numerous books and tracts on the "absence" (ghaybat) of the Hidden Imam emphasizing his prolonged life and that he will endure until the End of the Time when he will return to bring justice and equity. Yet despite great investment in rationalizing the absent of the Hidden Imam, this literature, by and large, was designed to give credence and legitimacy to the clerical establishment and their legal authority as jurists (mujtahids) in the absence of the Imam. In practice the clergy, particularly high ranking clergy -what today is known as ayatollahs- consistently rejected any claim to the advent of the Hidden Imam and even its impending possibility. This is well evident in their hostile fatwas throughout Shi'i history, especially in the Qajar era, and their persecution of followers of such messianic trends. Instead, increasingly since the 18th century, they advocated that the jurists collectively are the representative or the "deputy" of the Mahdi. Facing the current trend of expectation for the Mahdi, it seems that the Shi'i clergy have been taken off guard and don't know how to go about the outlandish insinuations coming from the Iranian president and his cohorts. As I have discussed in the last chapter some high clergy are following the new lead and express pride in the fact that they for long wrote about the "signs" of the Mahdi's advent. Yet majority of the more cautious and circumspect members of the clergy seems to be paying only a lip service to idea and treat the president's repeated statements about the impending advent of the Mahdi with silent skepticism.
As you mention in your book, there is also a journal called Maw'ud, which is filled with all kinds of superstitious beliefs. Why do you think they are promoting such khorafat?

Such publications as Maw'ud and many websites devoted to the idea of the Mahdi, including repeated conferences, seminars, secretariats, and an assortment of organizations devoted to Mahdism in today's Iran, serve a purpose however. They try to galvanize, it seems, the otherwise ideologically exhausted support for the regime with a very generous doze of financial support from the government or semi-governmental organizations that funnel funds for upkeep of website, publishing journals and paying for conference and seminars. It remains to be seen how much of grass roots support they enjoy but surely some of the ideas discussed or hinted at in these publications are sheer hate propaganda, recycled rhetoric of the Great Satan and a uncanny attempt to update and give currency to the prophecies of the Mahdi to make it relevant to the world affairs. Some insinuations are truly scary while others reflect popular Shi'i beliefs in a pseudo-intellectualized garb. In certain respect it reflects the worldview of the president and his supporters.
You talk about Jamkaran and how ordinary people and even the middle and upper classes go on pilgrimage to this site in the middle of the desert? You also said that Ahmadi Nejad government on the orders of Khamenei has spent or will be spending nearly 1.4 billion dollars on this site. Why do you think this is happening in light of the current economic hardship for Iranians? How do they justify this?

I don't think I need to dwell too much on the irrationality of governments in determining their priorities in Iran or elsewhere. As far as the Islamic Republic and more specifically the current president is concerned however, Jamkaran is a success story. Here there are tens of thousands who show up weekly to visit the site and outpour their inner frustrations in a seemingly sacred space. After all with the exception of Mashhad no other religious site in today's Iran seem to be attracting as much attention. Anyone who recognizes the place of propaganda -and no doubt the Shi'i clergy enjoy a millennium of expertise in this area- would recognize the value of a site that make people weep, pray, and write petitions for the Hidden Imam in order to share their problems and hope for the best. What is the worth of a billion or so dollars to offer such a collective therapeutic outlet? We should not forget that the Iranian society has become in a peculiar way more religious compared even to a generation earlier.
One of your chapters talks at length about the rise of the Babi movement. Can you tell us a bit more about its history and the circumstances in which it emerged?

The Babi movement that emerged in the middle of the 19th century was the latest, and possibly the most dramatic, example of messianic aspirations in Shi'i Iranian past (perhaps with the exception of Isma'ilism in its revolutionary phase in the 10 to 12th centuries). It claimed to fulfill the long-awaited return of the Mahdi at the End of the Time and thus the end of the Islamic dispensation. It was bound to meet with the hostility of the clerical establishment and eventually the rage of the Qajar state. What is however important about the movement compared to many examples in Islamic, more specifically Iranian Shi'i, history was its metaphorical interpretation of the Islamic Resurrection (Qiyamat) and cyclical view of history and the belief that religions like living organs have birth, growth, decline and eventual demise. It advocated that although all are of the common divine origin, each has to address the needs of specific time in human societies and evolution of human civilization. This idea, which articulated in later years and came to be known as "progressive revelation," naturally challenged the finality of the Islam and hence aroused the opposition of the religious establishment. Yet despite persecution and pressure it thrived in the Iranian setting as a semi-clandestine movement and despite bitter internal divisions evolved to what is today the Baha'i Faith. Still the apocalyptic impulses that are at the heart of Shi'i messianism was responsible for the rise and growth of the Babi and later Baha'i thought. The symbolic interpretation of the messianic prophecies, a humanization of the Mahdi and the dynamics embedded in the Shi'i tragedy and salvation stories all contributed to the shaping of the movement.
What is particularly interesting about this movement from the perspective of Iranian culture, is its indigenous sense of national awareness evident in the use of Persian language as the language of its scripture, its honoring of Fars as the sacred land, and its new time reckoning based on the Iranian solar calendar that celebrated the Nowruz. The Babi doctrine in its intricacies however was riddled with anachronistic ideas it inherited from its Shi'i popular culture and complicated because of its experimentation with a new sacred language. Nevertheless, its very breaking away from the sphere of Islam opened the way for later emergence of a more modern yet indigenous Baha'i doctrine.
What do you think of the social movement known as the Green Movement that took place after the 2009 elections? How does this movement relate to other movements that have taken place in the last century in Iran?

As has been observed, there is something generational about the Green movement. Here too we may detect the return of messianic aspirations among a new generation of Iranians frustrated with the hypocrisy and oppression and with the unfulfilled promises of the Islamic Revolution. Such aspirations however no longer seem to favor the advent of a savior in the traditional Shi'i garb, something which has already been exhausted by the regime. Yet there was a palpable hope in the demonstration and its symbolism, its use of green as the color of salvation which is sacred and yet peaceful and "green" in the contemporary environmental sense. I finished my book only a few months before the June 2009 election. Looking back at the last paragraphs it seems to me, without bragging, that they are somewhat prophetic. The messianic paradigm and hope for salvation is something very old in Iranian culture, perhaps as old as inception of Iran. It is therefore remarkable to see that such a paradigm finds a new context and a new exciting expression in our time.
Note: This article was first published by Iranian.com (http://www.iranian.com/)
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<center>
</center> Iran Gives Two-Week Ultimatum To Shell, Repsol (http://www.payvand.com/news/10/may/1104.html) - Iran has reportedly given European oil giants Shell and Repsol two weeks to decide on their contracts to develop major gas fields. 5/10/10

Is Iran a Nuclear Danger? Don't Believe It! (http://news.newamericamedia.org/news/view_article.html?article_id=66257a9422271ca87bdeddb383d4ad2c) - In advance of this week's United Nations Security Council Meeting on Nuclear Non-proliferation in New York, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton seemed be gearing up for a fight. On NBC's "Meet The Press" on May 2, she declared that, "Iran is in violation of its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty." -New America Media 5/10/10


Cambridge business owner weaves through history (http://www.wickedlocal.com/cambridge/features/x1560842842/Cambridge-business-owner-weaves-through-history) - On the floor of a Cambridge kitchen, lay a worn, tattered, and seemingly worthless rug. But it still caught the eye of Mohammad Nooraee, owner of Noor Oriental Rugs in Cambridge. The cream and black rug, it turns out, is an 18th century Persian rug, worth $15,000. -Cambridge Chronicle 5/10/10

UC Berkeley open doors to threatened scholars (http://www.mercurynews.com/breaking-news/ci_15044555) - The Stanford University political scientist lamented the circumstances that have kept him far from his family and friends in Iran. "The situation at the (Iranian) universities gets worse and worse every day," said the man, who requested anonymity because of the risk to his family. "They believe that one professor, like a disease, can infect many students." -San Jose Mercury 5/10/10


Postcard from Tehran (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/05/06/postcard_from_tehran?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full) - Western journalists don't get too many opportunities to visit Iran these days. On my recent trip, I found economic discontent, growing political apathy, and plenty of Persian swagger. -Hooman Majd, FP 5/10/10

Iranian Official: 'I Consider Musavi An Enemy Of God' (http://www.payvand.com/news/10/may/1106.html) - Gholamhossein Elham, a member of Iran's powerful Guardians Council, has reportedly said that opposition leader Mir Hossein Musavi is a "mohareb," which means "an enemy of God" or someone who takes up arms against the Iranian establishment. The charge carries the death sentence in the Islamic republic. -RFE 5/10/10


YES WE CANNES! ... (http://www.payvand.com/news/10/may/1105.html) - Kiarostami's "Certified Copy" highlights Binoche's Beauty as Iran's film maestro competes for Cannes Palme D'Or Win amidst bitter critics from fellow Iranian colleagues -Darius KADIVAR 5/10/10

Iran's Azad University, Coming Battleground Against Rafsanjani (http://www.payvand.com/news/10/may/1101.html) - As Azad University's new regulations, which require that its president be elected every four years, came into force, pro-government media have launched a verbal attack on its current and long-time president Abdollah Jasbi, who is also a leader of the conservative Motalefe Islami party while also being a close ally of Hashemi Rafsanjani -Nazanin Kamdar, Rooz Online 5/10/10

Iran: Political Executions Indication of Government's Insecurity (http://www.payvand.com/news/10/may/1102.html) - The sudden execution of five Iranian political prisoners today appears to signal a government policy of relying on politically-motivated executions to strengthen its position vis-à-vis its opposition through terror and intimidation, the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran said. 5/10/10

Popli Khalatbari Charitable Foundation: Malayek Center and Aliasghar Hospital (http://www.payvand.com/news/10/may/1103.html) - I have known Diana Khalatbari for many years and my admiration and respect for her has always been high. Last year, despite the fact that she lost her beloved husband after a long illness, she did not give up on her zest and enthusiasm for the charity Popli Khalatbari Charitable Foundation (PKCF) and within a short time she redoubled her efforts to raise funds for all the wonderful projects that PKCF starts, carries on and maintains in Iran and in other countries. -Syma Sayyah, Tehran 5/10/10\


Share5 Blood or Treasure? Obama's Crucial Choice in the Middle East (http://www.truthout.org/ira-chernus-blood-or-treasure-obamas-crucial-choice-middle-east59244) - Writing about U.S. Middle East policy used to be a boring job. You'd start out with "The U.S. supports Israel's stand on..." and then just fill in the details. No longer. Many pundits claim to smell the winds of policy change blowing from the White House. Every word about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from the president or his advisors is now parsed by journalists like so many soothsayers studying oracle bones. -truthout 5/10/10